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John Paul II’s Gamble with ‘the Meaning of Life’ 
 
“As often happens, the idea and the word together make their appearance as  
the marks of a kind of internal collapse, and what the word really seeks to indicate  
is the place where the collapse has taken place.” 
— Gabriel Marcel* 
 
More than any previous pope, John Paul II thought that Christian 
faith could be characterized as an answer to the question of “the mean-
ing of life.” The phrase appears throughout his pontificate, starting at 
the beginning, in Catechesi Tradendae, Familiaris Consortio, Salvifici 
Doloris, and Redemptoris Missio.1 The question of the meaning of life 
is especially prominent in all of his major documents from the 1990’s. 
Centesimus Annus frames Catholic social teaching in terms of “the irre-
pressible search for personal identity and for the meaning of life” and 
describes Marxism as an inadequate attempt to respond to “the loss of 
the authentic meaning of life.”2 Veritatis Splendor introduces moral re-
flection as mankind’s journey to discover the meaning of life, and in-
terprets Matthew’s story of the rich young man asking “What good 
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1 John Paul II: Apostolic Exhortation Catechesi Tradendae (Rome 1979), Apostolic Ex-
hortation Familiaris Consortio (Rome 1981), Apostolic Letter Salvifici Doloris (Rome 
1984), Encyclical Letter Redemptoris Missio (Rome 1990). All cited Vatican documents 
available online—see the section References for details. 
2 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus (Rome 1991), §§ 24, 41. 
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must I do to have eternal life?” as a question about the meaning of life.3 
Evangelium Vitae laments those factors that have diminished the ques-
tion of the meaning of life, seeks to renew that question, and presents 
Christ as offering the fullness of the answer to the question of the mean-
ing of life.4 Fides et Ratio makes the question of the meaning of life the 
central question of philosophy, and treats all ancient questions about 
life’s destiny and purpose as expressions of a quest for meaning, even 
assimilating Plato and Aristotle, and the Delphic exhortation “know thy-
self,” to this quest; indeed, it even claims that modern conceptions of 
reason are marked by a loss of the question of the meaning of life.5 Not 
surprisingly, then, the Catechism of the Catholic Church published un-
der John Paul II’s reign also frames Catholic teaching as a response to 
the question of “the meaning of life.”6 
To understand how radical this is, consider that before John Paul 
II, no social encyclical mentioned “the meaning of life,” nor did any 
previous encyclical of moral theology. The prolific and philosophical 
pope Leo XIII—the champion of philosophical revival (Aeterni Patris, 
1879) and founder of modern Catholic social teaching (Rerum Nova-
rum, 1891)—never wrote about “the meaning of life.” No previous Cat-
echism had ever mentioned “the meaning of life.” 
So as John Paul II—as well as many others—would have it, the 
meaning of life is the central question of religion and the moral life, 
taken up from the great stream of all human history, a question raised 
by Greek poets and philosophers, Roman statesmen, Church fathers, 
medieval scholastics, and by every authentic human culture Western 
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4 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Evangelium Vitae (Rome 1995), §§ 26, 49, 81. 
5 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio (Rome 1998), §§ 3, 6, 26, 30, 33, 56, 76, 
81; § 27; §§ 1–3; and §§ 47, 81, 88. 
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and otherwise—a question deeply rooted in the human heart, the ques-
tion which Christ came to answer. But, as a matter of empirical, philo-
logical history, this is highly contentious. Strictly speaking, historical 
evidence for a timeless question about “the meaning of life” is not to be 
found. As we will see, the question of the meaning of life is a recent 
invention; neither Socrates nor Plato, neither Matthew nor Paul, neither 
Augustine nor Aquinas ever asked about the meaning of life. 
What was John Paul II up to, in proclaiming the importance of 
the question of the meaning of life? By insisting on the universality of 
the question, was John Paul II aware he was making an unsupportable 
empirical claim about intellectual history? By integrating this question 
into Catholic theology, was he aware that he was being strikingly origi-
nal?  
This paper will argue that John Paul II’s embrace of the novel 
question of the meaning of life was intentional and calculated, an act of 
valiantly creative and sophisticated theological development. John Paul 
II, judging his rhetorical situation, took some poetic license in adopting 
for the Church the question of “the meaning of life.” Understanding 
why and how he did it, and what was at stake in so doing, gives us in-
sight into his approach to reason, human nature, and ethics. 
The Historical Origin of “The Meaning of Life” 
The question of the meaning of life has a particular, and very 
short, recent history. It is a 19th century invention. It was first asked in 
fits and starts around 1850, and only really took hold at the beginning 
of the 20th century. It didn’t enter official Catholic discourse until Vati-
can II, and then only reservedly. Far from a timeless expression of hu-
man wonder, it is a distinctively late-modern question. 
This might seem to be a narrowly pedantic point about a linguis-
tic technicality. Even if the particular phrase “the meaning of life” is a 
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recent coinage, couldn’t it still capture a common natural wonder about 
the significance of the human condition? Might it be reasonable to think 
that there is something rather universal about the quest for this, what-
ever particular label we might put on it in one age or another? Perhaps. 
On the other hand, even if the phrase “the meaning of life” is a novel 
phenomenon only linguistically, the emergence of the phrase is still a 
general Western development, occurring during the same specific pe-
riod in all major European languages. We should be curious why it 
emerged, and what else might have accompanied its emergence. What 
prompted Western thinkers suddenly to start speaking in terms of “the 
meaning of life,” when they had never done so before? And given that 
it is a new phrase, we must face the possibility that the new phrase does 
in fact signify a new concept, or whole framework of concepts; and we 
should ask what concept, or conceptual framework, might have pre-
ceded this phrase, which the use of this phrase might have contested or 
even replaced. If people didn’t use to ask about “the meaning of life,” 
what question did they once ask instead, and what does it say if today 
we might no longer be asking that question? We cannot assume that 
“the meaning of life” is a universal question, without first tracing the 
history of its emergence, and comparing it to whatever preceded it. 
It seems the credit for the first philosophical use of the German 
phrase, der Sinn des Lebens, belongs to Arthur Schopenhauer, in the 
second volume of his The World as Will and Representation (1844).7 
Digital library searches reveal scattered, apparently uninfluential, ear-
lier uses: for instance, in an 1825 play by Ernst von Houwald,8 in an 
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1823 literary review by Friedrich Wähner,9 and in an 1811 work of po-
litical history by Heinrich Luden.10 But a measure of the novelty of the 
German phrase is that Nietzsche is sometimes credited with first use, 
decades after Schopenhauer.11 Nietzsche probably deserves credit for 
popularizing the phrase in German; his first use seems to be in his 1874 
“Untimely Meditations,” commenting on Schopenhauer;12 it appears 
later in Also sprach Zarathustra (1883). 
In French, an early use was in 1865, when Émile Zola wrote that 
one morning “le sens de la vie” escaped his semi-autobiographical 
character Claude.13 The phrase was not common in French before then. 
“Le sens de la vie” was also the title of an 1889 moralistic novel by 
Édouard Rod,14 a usage which may be attributable to Russian influence: 
Leo Tolstoy was among the first—if not the first—to use the relevant 
Russian phrase (“смысл жизни”), in his “Confession,” first published 
in 1882. Rod probably read “Confession;” he and Tolstoy correspond-
ed, and shared a critique of Schopenhauer’s pessimistic reflections on 
the meaninglessness of life. 
The French and Russian connection points in the same direction 
as the first use of “the meaning of life” in English. Thomas Carlyle has 
a fictional German philosopher offer a pompous reflection on Freedom 
                                               
9 “Göthe und Pustkuchen oder über die beiden Wanderjahre Wilhelm Meisters und ihre 
Verfasser Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Poesie und Poetik herausgegeben 
vom Professor Schütz,” Hermes 3 (1823): 373. 
10 Ueber Sinn und Inhalt des Handbuchs der Staatsweisheit (Jena 1811), 2, 129, 200, 
216, 398. 
11 This view is promulgated by Jean Grondin, “Le sens de la vie: Une question assez ré-
cente, mais pleine de saveur,” Théologiques 9, no. 2 (2001): 7–15, and again in the first 
chapter of Grondin’s Du sens de la vie: Essai philosophique (Québec: Bellarmine, 2003). 
In both cases Grondin cites Volker Gerhardt, Friedrich Nietzsche (Munich: Beck, 1992), 
21. 
12 Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, vol. 3: “Schopenhauer als Erzieher” (Schloss-Chem-
nitz: Schmeitzner, 1874), 45. 
13 La confession de Claude (Paris: Charpentier, 1865), 243. 
14 Édouard Rod, Le sens de la vie (Paris 1889). 
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as “the meaning of life,” in what was clearly intended as a parody of 
philosophy, a comic send-up of German idealism. (Carlyle may have 
had in mind the first volume of Schopenhauer’s work, published in 
1818.) In Sartor Resartus,15 Carlyle imagines a fictional philosopher, 
Diogenes Teufelsdröckh (whose last name means “Devil’s-filth”), au-
thor of a philosophical treatise about clothing; a fictional narrator tries 
to make sense of Teufelsdröckh’s work, which includes the following 
reflection: 
“Temptations in the Wilderness!” exclaims Teufelsdröckh: “Have 
we not all to be tried with such? Not so easily can the old Adam, 
lodged in us by birth, be dispossessed. Our Life is compassed 
round with Necessity; yet is the meaning of Life itself no other 
than Freedom, than Voluntary Force: thus have we a warfare; in 
the beginning, especially, a hard-fought Battle. For the God-given 
mandate, Work though in Welldoing, lies mysteriously written, in 
Promethean, Prophetic Characters, in our hearts; and leaves us no 
rest, night or day, till it be deciphered and obeyed; till it burn 
forth, in our conduct, a visible, acted Gospel of Freedom.”16 
Freedom, necessity, interior restlessness and struggle, the self’s attempt 
to transcend the world—Carlyle was writing a send-up of German ide-
alism. There are genuine, redeemable insights here about the challenge 
of human freedom, insights that we will later come to associate with ex-
istentialism. But Carlyle has the narrator criticize this particular passage 
as an “ambitious figure,” and the philosopher’s work generally as pomp-
ous and vague, “Nothing but innuendoes, figurative crotchets: a typical 
Shadow, fitfully wavering, prophetico-satiric; no clear logical Picture.” 
It is clear that the first English use of “the meaning of life” was in fact a 
                                               
15 Originally serialized 1832–1834, published in book form in 1836 (US) and 1838 (UK). 
16 Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, in Three Books, Book II, Chapter IX, “The Everlast-
ing Yea.” This chapter originally published in Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Coun-
try IX, no. LII (April, 1834): 447–452. 




joke, and one about a particular modern trend in continental philoso-
phy.17 
In English, French, and Russian, then, the question of “the mean-
ing of life” emerges around the same time, and seems to have been 
prompted by the German usage first formulated in order to articulate or 
respond to an essentially negative answer. The question helps make in-
telligible, whether to face or to escape, the threat of meaninglessness: 
the articulation of the question reflects a felt need to overcome a pessi-
mistic or negative view about human life—the kind of answer implied 
by materialism, positivism, and the scientific critique of religion. Kier-
kegaard was also reflecting on the meaning of life (in Danish, meningen 
med livet) in the mid-1800s—but even his positive answer was in re-
sponse to the looming possibility of the negative alternative—that life 
was Meningslost, “meaningless.” 
In any case, from these scattered philosophical references, “the 
question of the meaning of life,” finds its home in a certain kind of late-
modern discourse, romantic, existential, psychological, aesthetic—a 
world populated as much by poets, novelists and artists as by philoso-
phers and theologians. It has little use even into the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, but even then it is used by the likes of Freud and Dilthey, 
Spengler and Hesse, Thomas Mann and William James, Camus and 
Sartre, Virginia Woolf and the Bloomsbury set.18 And always, even 
those who propose a positive answer by advancing something satisfying 
as “the meaning of life,” seem to feel the pressure of a looming, barely 
escapable negative answer, that perhaps life is meaningless or absurd. 
                                               
17 Although Carlyle’s is apparently the first English use of “the meaning of life,” there 
is an earlier use of the phrase, “life’s meaning,” in Tracts of the American Unitarian As-
sociation (1827), 41 and 46. 
18 Even so, it is interesting where explicit formulation of “the meaning of life” is not 
found. I have yet to discover it in Proust, or Whitman, or Ibsen, for instance. 
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As a kind of shorthand we can thus say that “the question of the 
meaning of life” is an existentialist question, and as such about as his-
torically contingent as existentialism itself, a philosophical movement 
rooted in particular cultural circumstances. True, existentialism claimed 
to get at universal questions of human life, but it is a feature of existen-
tialism that it articulates those questions in terms of “the meaning of 
life” (and related questions like the meaning of suffering, the meaning 
of death, the meaning of freedom, or finding meaning in life—all ques-
tions of meaning) instead of some other sorts of questions.19 
Even after it started to take hold, the new question of “the mean-
ing of life,” did not grow into a proper new field or sub-discipline in 
philosophy. To the extent that it survived outside of existentialism, it 
was subsumed under ethics, where it was taken to be commensurate 
with previous questions of ultimate moral concern. And while it found 
expression in novels and plays, by the second half of the 20th century 
“the meaning of life” also came to be adopted outside of philosophy 
and literature by the social sciences, as a neutral, objective way to char-
acterize individuals and cultures finding value or direction. Treating 
questions that might have traditionally been thought of as having reli-
gious or moral stakes as instead questions of “the meaning of life” al-
lowed the social sciences to attend to the powerfully value-laden di-
mensions of human experience without taking sides—indeed pretend-
ing that it is possible and preferable to avoid taking sides—in answer-
ing those questions. 
                                               
19 The existential emphasis of the question is reflected in Yuval Lurie, Tracking the 
Meaning of Life: A Philosophical Journey (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
2006). Lurie traces the question to Tolstoy, and a reaction to Schopenhauer; and even in 
claiming that the question has some ancient roots, admits that there was a prior “riddle 
of life” question that Tolstoy creatively reformulated as “the meaning of life.” Grondin, 
also attentive to the existential character—and even tragic hopelessness—of the ques-
tion of the meaning of life, compares it to a more ancient question about a “saveur de la 
vie” (Grondin, “Le sens de la vie,” 14). 




Of course, in popular discourse the phrase “the meaning of life” 
is sometimes taken to be corny or pretentious, rather than earnestly phil-
osophical. But whatever its current or future uses, the origin of “the 
meaning of life” question is clear: along with other 19th century inven-
tions like the telephone, the electric lightbulb, and the internal combus-
tion engine, it may be hard to imagine life without it, but it is a late civ-
ilizational invention. Despite being treated as a timeless, eternal, fun-
damentally human question, “the” question of “the meaning of life” is a 
contingent social construct. Far from being, as John Cottingham called 
it, “the question that won’t go away,”20 it is the long-absent question 
that doesn’t ever seem to have been missed, and waited a long time 
before it finally showed up. Culturally and politically, its context is one 
of late-modern uncertainty and secularism. The connotation of the ques-
tion is subjective, and the implicit pressure to answer it is the weight of 
pessimism and doubt: it is hard to escape the impression that the ques-
tion of the meaning of life only emerges in response to late modern po-
litical, intellectual, and social conditions that otherwise suggest that life 
is “meaningless.” 
Before “The Meaning of Life” 
What then did people wonder about before they wondered about 
the meaning of life? For most of Western history, up into the 20th cen-
tury, the question most consistently asked about life concerns not its 
meaning but its goal, good, or end. The question was most commonly 
formulated in terms of “the end of man” or “man’s chief good” (where 
“man” is obviously the gender-neutral term for the human species). The 
Greeks called it the telos, Latins the summum bonum or ultimus finis. 
We may call it the question of human purpose—where by “purpose” 
                                               
20 John Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life (London: Routledge, 2003), 1. 
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we don’t mean an individual agent’s intention or conscious sense of 
purpose, nor a particular path or vocation to fulfill, but the intrinsic, es-
sential why of the species. What are human beings for? What is the ul-
timate point of our creaturely existence? 
This is the question that dominates the central and largest of the 
three parts of Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae—Question 1 of 
the First Part of the Second Part is “On Man’s Last End,” and the fol-
lowing several hundred questions examine all that is entailed in answer-
ing that question. The question of man’s purpose or end is addressed in 
Augustine’s City of God and Confessions. It is the question that moti-
vates Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. No character in a Socratic dia-
logue ever asked about the meaning of life, but many of Plato’s dia-
logues consider the human good or end explicitly (e.g., Republic and 
Philebus), and those that don’t can easily be read as relating their sub-
jects—virtues, laws, speech, knowledge, pleasure, friendship, love and 
death—to that question. 
The tone could be said to be set by Greek drama. It would be a 
stretch to interpret Sophocles’ Antigone as an exploration of the mean-
ing of life. It is clearly and forcefully about the end or purpose of life, 
in relation to family, state, and the gods. Even the great Western stories 
about a particular character finding his personal path—Illiad and Odys-
sey, the Aeneid, the Divine Comedy—only make sense as reflections on 
how an individual’s destiny can be conceived in relation to the pursuit 
of the human good. It would seem to trivialize these epic stories to 
force them into the paradigm of exploring “the meaning of life.”21 
Into the 19th century, even as the new question of the meaning of 
life was beginning to be formulated, the question of an intrinsic human 
purpose remained dominant in secular and religious contexts. When 
                                               
21 Nonetheless Terry Eagleton tries to assimilate the genre of Greek tragedy under the 
question of the meaning of life in his ahistorical survey, The Meaning of Life: A Very 
Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 




Thoreau set out “to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life,” he 
did so explicitly questioning the catechism’s answer to “the chief end of 
man,” but still in pursuit of his own, alternative answer.22 We do not 
find Marx speaking of “the meaning of life,” though he did formulate 
his materialistic anthropology in terms of “the purpose of life.”23 Her-
bert Spencer, even while articulating a utilarian ethics grounded in posi-
tivism, still speaks of human nature and human purpose; the question of 
life having “meaning” does not arise for him. 
In philosophy, and in Catholic theological instruction, the prima-
ry question has always been, quite explicitly, about the purpose of life. 
Although John Paul II praised John Henry Newman’s reflections on 
“the meaning of life,”24 Newman and other prominent Catholic thinkers 
of the 19th century never asked about “the meaning of life,” but fre-
quently spoke of “the end of man” or “the chief good of man.” And of 
course the 1885 Baltimore Catechism’s very first lesson—the starting 
point from which it proceeded to instruct in the essentials of the faith—
was entitled, “The End of Man,” a phrase further glossed by the cate-
chism as “the purpose for which he was created.” Through the 20th cen-
tury and beyond, it remained not only possible but common to receive a 
traditional philosophical and theological education without ever ad-
dressing the question of “the meaning of life.”25 
                                               
22 Henry David Thoreau, Walden; or, Life in the Woods (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 
1854), both from the section, “Where I Lived, and What I Lived For.” 
23 Karl Marx, 1844 manuscripts, Third Manuscript, “Private Property and Commun-
ism.” Available online—see the section References for details. 
24 John Paul II, “Letter to the Archbishop of Birmingham on the First Centenary of the 
Death of John Henry Newman” (Vatican 1990), § 2. 
25 Étienne Gilson, who was otherwise willing to take liberties in translating central ide-
as of medieval thought, never seems to have spoken of “le sens de la vie.” 
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Meaning versus Purpose, 
and Changing Conceptions of Rationality 
To suppose that the question of “the meaning of life” is a time-
less, universal question, is to insist that it captures what is formulated in 
terms of the question about man’s ultimate end or good or purpose. 
This would be very hard to sustain. The question of the purpose of life, 
if taken seriously, is intrinsically teleological and essentialist. It pre-
sumes that there is such a thing as true human fulfillment, rooted in hu-
man nature, which reflects a definite purpose or intention of its maker. 
In Aristotelian terms, the question implicates three of the four causes: 
in asking about the end (final cause) of man, it presumes that there is an 
essential human nature (formal cause), which has been communicated 
to man from an agent (efficient cause). 
Put another way, to ask after the purpose or end of human life is 
at once to create a field for practical moral questions—How should we 
live? For what end should I act?—and to frame that field in the context 
of fundamentally metaphysical questions—what is the true origin, na-
ture, and destiny of human beings? This is exactly what we see reflect-
ed in the design of the whole of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae—which 
places the moral reflection of the Secunda Pars (previously mentioned) 
in relation to God, as creator of human nature (explored in the Prima 
Pars), and Who alone can lead us to the fulfillment of our end (ex-
plored in the Tertia Pars). 
By contrast, the question of the meaning of life seems formulated 
precisely to avoid both the moral field and metaphysical frame. Mean-
ing is subjective, placing an emphasis on the interior life, feelings, emo-
tions, awareness, consciousness. What makes me feel purposive doesn’t 
necessarily speak to the question of an intrinsic, essential purpose. 
“Meaning” does indeed suggest directionality—something is meaning-
ful or significant if it makes reference to something else. But this is not 




the directionality of action toward an end, rather it is the directionality 
of symbol to what is symbolized. To ask about the meaning of life is 
almost to ask an aesthetic question: what will my life evoke, what will 
it represent? 
As a consequence, notice what questions further arise after we 
open up the question of “the meaning of life”: is it the same for every-
one, or a matter of individual perspective? Do we make meaning, or 
discover it? Do we entertain the possibility that there is no meaning? If 
my life feels meaningful to me, is it really meaningful? These are exis-
tentialist questions—questions of real personal seriousness, to be sure, 
but raised from a position disconnected from a moral or metaphysical 
framework. By contrast, notice what further questions arise from the 
question of the purpose or end of life: where does it come from? How 
can I achieve it? Is this or that action compatible with it? These are 
questions of theology and ethics—questions of moral seriousness strong-
ly rooted in a metaphysical framework. The question of life’s meaning 
places an emphasis on subjective fulfillment; the question of life’s pur-
pose can include that, but relates the notion of personal fulfillment to a 
question that draws one outside of oneself: what is my life for, how can 
I bring my life into its intended order? It is the difference between ask-
ing what might happen to make me feel fulfilled given my circum-
stances, and asking what should fulfill me in light of the true structure 
of reality.26 
                                               
26 Compare Gabriel Marcel’s observations about the rise of interest in the notion of “val-
ue”: “[A]s soon as we start using the term ‘value’ in strictly philosophical discourse, 
there is every reason to fear that the way is being paved toward . . . sinister confusions. 
I am thus led to make the no doubt paradoxical assertion that the introduction of the 
idea of value into philosophy, an idea almost foreign to the great metaphysicians of the 
past, is, as it were, a symptom of the kind of fundamental devaluation of reality itself. 
As often happens, the idea and the word together make their appearance as the marks of 
a kind of internal collapse, and what the word really seeks to indicate is the place where 
the collapse has taken place.” Marcel finds the same phenomenon at work in the emer-
gence of the word “personalism,” which, he says, “would only have been possible in an 
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So consider the kind of answers one could give to the old, more 
permanent question about the goal or end of life: virtue, happiness, un-
ion with God, life everlasting. “Why did God make you? God made me 
to know Him, to love Him, and to serve Him in this world, and to be 
happy with Him forever in heaven.” No wonder the authors of the Bal-
timore Catechism, like Thomas Aquinas, could use the question of hu-
man purpose to structure an instruction in Christian wisdom. Do an-
swers like this even make sense as answers to the question of the mean-
ing of life? One would have to say, in Kierkegaardian fashion, only if 
one chose to make the leap of faith, to believe those answers, to make 
them meaningful for you.27 
Alasdair MacIntyre has defended a teleological approach to eth-
ics by connecting it to the possibility of making life intelligible as a nar-
rative.28 This might sound like it is a version of making life “meaning-
ful,” although MacIntyre strongly denies an easy equation between an 
Aristotelian purpose and existential meaning. Simply finding meaning 
cannot be the telos of life. True, if one is not aware of a purpose in 
one’s life, one will feel that one’s life is meaningless, but that doesn’t 
mean that “living a meaningful life” makes sense as the goal of life. 
MacIntyre is even willing to allow that Kierkegaard, for instance, did 
have a teleological view of life, but Kierkegaard departed from Aris-
totle in his understanding of the mode of perceiving one’s actions as 
                                               
increasingly dehumanized world, in which the reality of what one means by ‘the per-
son’ is every day trampled underfoot.” Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Humanity 
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1952), 127. 
27 For a typical example of how the question of meaning of life leads in this subjectivist 
direction, see Julian Baggini, What’s It All About? Philosophy and the Meaning of Life 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
28 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 
especially Chapter 15, “The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a 
Tradition.” 




oriented toward a telos.29 MacIntyrean narrative is a kind of rationality, 
but Kierkegaard (as Tolstoy) was eager to place “meaning” outside of 
rationality. For Kierkegaard, man’s fundamental motives are more a 
matter of non-rational psychological mechanisms—hence Kierkegaard’s 
“ethical” reasoning is closer to “aesthetic” feeling than to more familiar 
forms of rational intelligibility. 
So it is not a surprise that, even when taken seriously as the ulti-
mate question of human life, the question of the meaning of life is re-
garded as highly personal. Unlike the question of the end of man, which 
is a general question about the essential good of human nature as such, 
the question of the meaning of life is individualistic and particular. The 
strength, and the weakness, of the question is that it seems to put the 
weight of responsibility on the one asking it to supply an answer from 
his or her own private, and probably inarticulable, resources. 
As a consequence, those who take the question of the meaning of 
life most seriously seem to turn the question around, and make it less a 
question of abstract moral theorizing than a question of personal com-
mitment. As earnestly characterized by Viktor Frankl, the question of 
the meaning of life seems to transform from a common question about 
human life, to a personal question about finding one’s unique vocation. 
Frankl described the challenge of life in the concentration camp:  
We needed to stop asking about the meaning of life, and instead 
to think of ourselves as those who were being questioned by life 
. . . Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the 
right answer to its problems and to fulfill the tasks which it con-
stantly sets for each individual. These tasks, and therefore the 
meaning of life, differ from man to man, and from moment to 
                                               
29 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Once More on Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard after MacIntyre: 
Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2001), 344–345. 
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moment. Thus it is impossible to define the meaning of life in a 
general way.30 
So even for Frankl, concerned as he is with helping to find meaning in 
the face of what could so easily seem meaningless, the question of the 
meaning of life admits of no general answer, and is not even the right 
question to ask. 
Is the question of the meaning of life even a meaningful ques-
tion? That challenge was posed by positivist philosophers (e.g., Moritz 
Schlick and A. J. Ayer), who in their eagerness to identify truly scien-
tific questions, capable of verification by empirical observation, dis-
missed whole classes of inquiry as meaningless. The positivists were 
right, in a way—the question of the meaning of life is a meaningless 
question—but in recognizing that they were not so much announcing a 
new discovery, as springing a trap they had set themselves. The trap 
was the dismissal of all moral evaluation as merely the expression of 
personal feeling. 
This positivist trap was built with the materials inherited from 
their predecessors in modern philosophy. The key figure in this story, 
as in so much else of modern philosophy, is David Hume. Hume em-
braced, and made others face, the inevitable consequence of the ration-
alist’s view of instrumental reason, that the mind cannot know the pur-
poses or natures of things—or even whether there are purposes and na-
tures of things. It follows that moral conviction cannot be grounded in 
knowledge of what things are. Given the continued power and success 
of science, it was only a matter of time before someone made the posi-
tivist move: to re-characterize science, formerly thought of as pursuing 
the natures of things, as the formulation of empirically verifiable laws, 
with the concommitant relegation of all evaluative judgment (moral, 
                                               
30 Viktor Frankl, From Death-Camp to Existentialism: A Psychiatrist’s Path to a New 
Therapy (Beacon Press, 1959), 107. Subsequent editions retitled: Man’s Search for Mean-
ing: An Introduction to Logotherapy. 




aesthetic, and theological) to the expressions of feelings, technically ir-
rational and meaningless. 
Through much of modernity, even through early positivism, the 
question of the purpose of life was so powerful as to reassert itself even 
as conceptions of reason grew ever more antithetical to it. Pascal re-
sponded to the early modern conception of scientific rationality, show-
ing its limits in light of the “reasons of the heart,” and even co-opting 
instrumental reason (in his “wager”) to reassert the question of how one 
is to live. Kant resisted Humean skepticism, trying valiantly to relocate 
ethics, metaphysics and even religion itself within the scope of rational 
inquiry. And as we have seen, in response to the positivist conception 
of reason, Kierkegaard embraced the irrationality of religious faith as 
the very sign of its superior sort of truth. But in doing so—in accepting 
the positivist conception of rationality—Kierkegaard so subjectivized 
the question of human destiny as to frame it in new terms, no longer as 
an intelligibly grasped purpose or goal or chief good of life, but as a 
personally felt, and extra-rational, meaning of life.31 
John Paul II’s Personalist Gamble 
Situated in the context of this modern narrowing of reason, the 
emergence of the question of the meaning of life is not merely a trivial 
semantic shift, superficially covering the persistence of a common, un-
                                               
31 We have seen that the question of the meaning of life had continental origins; it re-
mains alive especially in phenomenological strands of German philosophy that attempt 
to articulate an alternative to this Humean/positivist conception of rationality. The ques-
tion has often been discussed in relation to Hans-Georg Gadamer, for instance (e.g., by 
Jean Grondin, Du sens de la vie; Jay L. Garfield, “Philosophy, Religion, and the Her-
meneutic Imperative,” in Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Ga-
damer, ed. Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher [Cambridege, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2002], 97–110; and Mirela Oliva, “Hermeneutics and the Meaning of Life,” Ep-
oché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 22, no. 2 [2018]: 523–539). Even so, it 
seems that Gadamer himself was not preoccupied with the question as such. 
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derlying question within a stable, coherent conceptual framework. The 
shift in the formulation of the question embodies a shift in the actual 
question being asked, which reflects a dramatic change in the general 
conceptual framework assumed by those questions—a dramatic change 
in the assumptions made about the world, about the human condition, 
about rationality, and about the kinds of questions that can intelligibly 
be asked. The question of the meaning of life simply is not, and should 
not be confused with, the question of the end of man or the purpose of 
life. The two questions entertain different sorts of answers, give rise to 
different associated questions, and make different assumptions about 
the nature of man and reality. 
As I have framed it so far, it seems that there would be three 
choices available when faced the historical displacement of the question 
of purpose by the question of meaning. Option 1: One could ignore the 
differences between the two questions, and continue acting as if the 
new and old questions are really different versions of the same ques-
tion. This has so far been the most common strategy, but the arguments 
presented here render that untenable. Option 2: One could celebrate the 
shift, adopt the new question, and bid good riddance to the old question. 
Presumably there are some who would embrace that option; I will leave 
it up to those so inclined to take up that strategy. Option 3: One could 
find the new question problematic, and recommend not asking it, and 
seeking to recover the old question. That has been the implicit position 
of my argument so far. 
But there is another choice. Option 4: one could believe that the 
old question is more important and fundamental, but recognize that the 
new question—the question of meaning—seems to have taken some 
hold, and one could seek to use that question, not so much to answer it, 
as to direct people back to the old question. In practice, I think this 
might look a lot like Option 1—it might involve treating the question of 
the meaning of life as just the latest formulation of an age-old question. 




But I think it is different from Option 1, and that it was part of the crea-
tive genius of John Paul II to attempt to chart this path. 
When John Paul II embraced the question of life’s meaning, did 
he ignore the differences between that question and the older question 
of life’s purpose?32 Was he aware of the differences between the ques-
tions, and embracing the new question as a legitimate alternative, a the-
ological development, that ought to replace the old question? It seems 
that John Paul II’s formation in both the Thomistic and phenomenolog-
ical traditions makes the question of “the meaning of life” an interesting 
test case. What we find is that John Paul II understood that the old ques-
tion of purpose is more important and fundamental, but recognized that 
the new question of meaning had achieved significant cultural purpose; 
he therefore seems to have attempted to use the new question of mean-
ing in order to reawaken the old question of purpose. In that way, his 
appeal to “the meaning of life” was probably intended (much like his 
appeal to “freedom” in Veritatis Splendor) not to replace, but to redirect 
attention back to, more classical notions which the tradition would have 
described in other terms. 
By integrating “the meaning of life” into Catholic theological dis-
course, John Paul II seems to be accepting but perhaps co-opting the 
language of the age, attempting a creative re-imagining of the histori-
cally contingent question of the meaning of life as a path back to the 
truly timeless question of life’s purpose. As his extensive use of “the 
meaning of life” in Fides et Ratio confirms, John Paul II undoubtedly 
interprets that question in light of reason’s “sapiential dimension” and 
“metaphysical range,” hoping to rejuvenate the classical conceptual 
                                               
32 In Polish, sens życia is as novel as any other European language’s phrase for “the 
meaning of life” (emerging in the second half of the 19th century), and in Latin the 
phrase for “the meaning of life,” sensus vitae, is also a neologism which comes to be 
used in ecclesial documents only in the 20th century; it seems to have had no classical 
uses, and the very few appearances of the phrase in early modern books signify some-
thing different (e.g., life’s sense powers). 
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framework. It is not possible that he intended to accept the implications 
of the new question’s native intellectual context—subjectivism, meta-
physical skepticism, and the narrowing of reason—given how confi-
dently he strives to redirect the meaning question to more traditional 
questions of human nature and purpose. This is entirely consistent with 
other ways in which John Paul II, in recognizing the anxieties of secu-
larism, did not condemn, but found new opportunity to evangelize. 
So while John Paul II seems to take the question of the meaning 
of life at face value, upon closer inspection we can find him telling us 
that such an existential question is so pressing and so frustrating pre-
cisely because human nature is not such as to be satisfied by asking it, 
but must find in it a more fundamental question, one capable of leading 
us back to God. This suggestion deserves to be tested in greater detail 
in the various magisterial texts cited at the beginning of this article,33 
but for present purposes we may take a single representative passage 
from Centesimus Annus, § 55, to illustrate. 
In this passage, which draws rhetorical strength from association 
with a saint and another Pope, John Paul II links the meaning question 
to traditional metaphysical questions about man’s origin, nature, and 
destiny: 
The Church receives “the meaning of man” from Divine Revela-
tion. “In order to know man, authentic man, man in his fullness, 
one must know God,” said Pope Paul VI, and he went on to 
quote Saint Catherine of Siena, who, in prayer, expressed the 
same idea: “In your nature, O eternal Godhead, I shall know my 
own nature.” 
                                               
33 By extension, this hypothesis also deserves to be explored with respect to earlier 
writings of Karol Wojtyła, as well as texts by those who influenced the formation of his 
“Thomistic personalism.” As we would expect, the phrase “sens de la vie” does not 
seem to appear in any of the writings of the Thomist Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, a 
teacher of Wojtyła at the Angelicum in Rome, but “der Sinn des Lebens” does appear in 
works by the phenomenologist Max Scheler, about whom Wojtyła wrote his doctoral 
thesis at Jagellonian University. 




A footnote gives further license to the question of “meaning,” citing 
Paul VI’s 1965 address at the close of the Second Vatican Council:  
The Catholic religion is man’s life because it determines life’s 
nature and destiny [supremum finem]; it gives life its real mean-
ing [pleniorumque ei sensum attribuit], it establishes the supreme 
law of life and infuses it with that mysterious activity which we 
may say divinizes it. 
The reference to the Second Vatican Council grounds John Paul 
II’s use of the meaning of life question, and it seems that this is where 
the question entered the official discourse of Catholic teaching—not as 
a new framework for moral evaluation, but as a new rhetorical entry to 
the longstanding framework. It appears, clearly but modestly, in Gau-
dium et Spes (1965, to which John Paul II, as Karol Wojtyła, contrib-
uted) and before that in Lumen Gentium (1964, composed without any 
intervention from Wojtyła). It makes a single appearance in the decree 
Ad Gentes (1965), but not in Dignitatis Humanae (1965). 
The declaration Nostra Aetate formulates the question, but notice 
how firmly it embeds it within the classical metaphysical and moral 
questions:  
What is man? What is the meaning, the aim of our life? What is 
moral good, what is sin? Whence suffering and what purpose 
does it serve? Which is the road to true happiness? What are 
death, judgment and retribution after death? What, finally, is that 
ultimate inexpressible mystery which encompasses our existence: 
whence do we come, and where are we going?34 
In short, the “meaning of life” question is introduced to official Catho-
lic discourse at Vatican II, but could hardly be seen as central to that 
council; in the few cases it does appear, the documents insist (even 
more firmly than John Paul II’s encyclicals) on connecting the question 
of the meaning of life to the question of the purpose of life, and they 
                                               
34 Paul VI, Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions Nost-
ra Aetate (Rome 1965), § 1. 
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affirm the importance of understanding man as made in the image of 
God, and Christ as revealing the fullness of truth about human nature 
and destiny—in other words, in terms of the classical question of the ul-
timate purpose, good or end of human life. 
The development of Catholic rhetoric about ultimate human ques-
tions could implausibly suggests that perhaps the newer question of 
“the meaning of life” is not so different from the older question of hu-
man purpose. John Paul II’s enthusiastic adoption of the question seems 
to be a counterexample to what would otherwise be evident: the ques-
tion of the meaning of life is a radical departure from the truly funda-
mental question of human purpose. But John Paul II is the exception 
that proves the rule. He confirms that the proper question to ask about 
life is a moral question, linked to a metaphysical question: the question 
of the chief good or ultimate end of human life. The question of “the 
meaning of life” cannot be left to its own, native implications of subjec-
tivity and individualism, but can only be adopted as a relevant question 
if it is brought back within the orbit of a more substantive moral and 
metaphysical perspective. 
Conclusion: A Future for “The Meaning of Life”? 
What then is to be gained by adopting the rhetoric of the “mean-
ing” of life? Would it be any great loss if the question does fade on its 
own, and will there be any great gain if it is kept alive within the Catho-
lic intellectual tradition? More to the point, why should the Catholic in-
tellectual tradition want to keep that question alive, given that it previ-
ously played no important role in that tradition, nor in most of human 
history, and that when it did arrive it competed with and effectively 
displaced the classical question of human nature and destiny so central 
to Western reflection, and in particular to Christian faith? 




The irony is that if the question of the meaning of life does sur-
vive, it may be thanks to a bold rhetorical gambit by John Paul II. Al-
though you wouldn’t know it from reading his encyclicals, the history 
of human reflection never before knew, and still does not need, that 
question, and Catholic teaching would be virtually free of it without 
John Paul II’s peculiar embrace. Still, attention to this peculiar embrace 
only confirms that the question of the meaning of life is indeed, on its 
own terms, a dead-end question, in need of radical translation back into 
a very different, and truly timeless, question for it to play any effective 
and fruitful role in human life. Jesus Christ does not make sense as an 
answer to “the question” about “the meaning of life;” Christ reveals to 
us not a “meaning” but the fullness of truth about our nature and pur-
pose as made in God’s image, fallen, and offered salvation by the Tri-






John Paul II’s Gamble with ‘the Meaning of Life’ 
SUMMARY 
One of John Paul II’s remarkable innovations was his embrace of the question of “the 
meaning of life.” The question of “the meaning of life” was never asked before the 19th 
century, and it was slow to be integrated into Catholic discourse. When the question of 
life’s meaning emerged, it effectively replaced a prior question, about the purpose or te-
los of life, with a very different set of theoretical assumptions. From the traditional per-
spective, the question of life’s meaning is highly suspicious, and even Pope John Paul 
II’s unparalleled embrace of the question confirms that he framed his personalism in 
terms of the older question of life’s purpose or telos. 
                                               
35 Previous versions of the argument in this paper were presented for the Thomistic In-
stitute at the University of Maryland (October 12, 2017), and as a five-part series of 
guest posts on “The Virtue Blog” (December 2017), and I received helpful feedback 
from both. I am grateful for conversation and correspondence about the central 
arguments with Mirela Oliva and Tim Mawson, and especially to Dr. Oliva for her 
interest in engaging, and encouragement in sharing, my ideas. 
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